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REALIZATION OF INCOME THROUGH CANCELLATIONS,
MODIFICATIONS, AND BARGAIN PURCHASES OF
INDEBTEDNESS: II*

L. Hart W rightt
Signi-ficance of Matters Involving the Particular
Consideration Received on Incurring the Obligation
Introductory note. That some matters relating to the particular
consideration received by a debtor on incurring an obligation would
affect the applicability of the Kirby case135 to a saving derived by him
from a subsequent cancellation or other bargain discharge was one of
the first propositions settled by the Supreme Court. For the Kirby case
itself justified the earlier immunity which had been granted the apparently solvent Kerbaugh-Empire Company1 36 on the ground that the
funds which the latter had borrowed were lost in the venture for which
its loan had been procured.
Subsequent inquiry into the significance of matters relating to the
consideration which was received by the debtor has centered on three
different questions. The first of these involved the kind and amount of
consideration which must have been received by him at the time the
obligation was incurred if the Kirby doctrine was to apply to the entire
saving achieved from his subsequent discharge of the debt. The second
involved the significance of the fact that the consideration received
was of a type which justified the debtor, if on the accrual basis, in taking
an immediate deduction for the amount of the obligation. Contrasted
with these two matters, attention in the case of the third question was
centered on events which occurred after the obligation had been incurred; to what extent, for example, should application of the Kirby
doctrine be affected by the debtor's continued retention of, or the realized or unrealized decline in the value of, the asset which was received
by him when the debt was created? Discussion of these three questions
follows.
Signi-ficance of the kind and amount of consideration received -on
incurring the obligation. Judgments suffered in connection with various kinds of tort liability adequately demonstrate that binding obliga,,. Part I of this article was published in the February issue, 49 Mms. L. REv. 459
(1951).-Ed.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
135 284 U.S. 1, 52 S.Ct. 4 (1931).
136 Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 46 S.Ct. 449 (1926).
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tions are not always supported by consideration. It is equally well
known that even a contractual liability incurred by a debtor may be
supported by a detriment suffered by the creditor as well as by a benefit running to the debtor. In view of the historical notion that income
involved the receipt of something of value, it is not surprising that .
the question should arise: of what significance is the fact that a debt
which was subsequently discharged at a saving was not originally supported in full by consideration actually running to the debtor in money
or money's worth?
The earliest regulations providing for a tax on gains derived from
the discharge of obligations attached significance to the original consideration received by the debtor only in the instance where bonds
were issued at a discount.137 The gain in such case was to be determined, according to the regulations, by computing the amount by
which the original issue price plus previously amortized discount exceeded the retirement price. The fact that the face amount of the obligation in this particular instance was a neutral factor was not construed
by the commissioner, however, to mean that the value of the consideration actually received at the time an obligation was assumed would
in other instances be substituted in the calculations for the face amount
of the obligation.138 In other words, he took the position that a gain
under the Kirby doctrine was generally determined by subtracting the
discharge price from the amount then owing. The anomalous character claimed for the situation where bonds were issued at a discount
was presumably attributable to the theory that the unamortized discount was simply one form of promised but as yet unearned interest.139
Reasoning logically from that appraisal, the face amount-to the extent
of the unearned, unamortized discount-would not be really owing
when a bond is prematurely retired. Accordingly, there is no real saving which could be subjected to the doctrine in question if the discharge
figure is less than the face amount only by the amount of the unamortized discount.
The commissioner's assumption in other cases, that the value of the
consideration originally received was a neutral factor, was first attacked
before the Board of Tax Appeals in Rail Joint Co.140 There a corpo137 Only two articles, numbers 51 and 544, in U.S. Treas. Reg. 45 concerned such
savings. The latter of these dealt with bonds issued at a discount.
138 See the government's argument in Rail Joint Co., 22 B.T.A. 1277 (1931).
139 American Smelting & Refining Co. v. United States, (3d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d)
883.
140 22 B.T.A. 1277 (1931).
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ration re-appraised its assets at $3,000,000 over their previous book
value and issued bonds in that amount as a dividend. These were later
re-acquired at less than par. At the time of its decision the board was
of the opinion that the Kerbaugh-Empire Co. case generally precluded
the taxation of gains solely attributable to bargain discharges.141 Consequently, it was not surprising that it upset the deficiency which the
government had assessed on the alleged gain in this case. But in so doing, the board did state that a like result would have been reached even
if it had held a different view with respect to those instances in which an
asset had been received at the time the obligation was incurred. Its
reasons for this latter view corresponded with those which led the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit to affirm-even though the Kirby
case had been decided in the interirn.142
Neither court thought that the mere discharge of a liability for a
sum less than that owed constituted in itself a realization of income.
The Second Circuit, for example, did not believe that the Kirby case
had wholly eliminated one of the requirements which was thought to
have been established by Eisner v. Macomber, 143 namely, the notion
that income involved the receipt of an asset. While the Kirby case
clearly demonstrated that income could be realized even though an
asset was not received at the exact time realization occurred, the quotation below reveals that the Second Circuit thought that the receipt
of an asset sometime in the course of the transaction was indispensable
to• the realization of a gain at its termination:
"Hence it is apparent that the corporation received no asset
which it did not possess prior to the opening and closing of the
bond transaction, and it is impossible to see wherein it has realized
any taxable income. In such circumstances the Kirby Case cannot be regarded as controlling."144
While no decision contrary to that in the Rail Joint Co. case has
yet appeared, and though its principle has been approved in other
cases,1 45 the opposite result would have been at least equally satisfactory.
In the first place, as another author has said, this particular situation
could have been treated as though a cash dividend had been paid, the
same then being considered as returned by the stockholders to the cor141 See discussion in Part I of this article, 49 MICH. L. REv. 459 at 461 (1951).
142 Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., (2d Cir. 1932) 61 .F. (2d) 751.
143 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920).
144 Commissioner v. Rail joint Co., (2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 751 at 752.
145 C. Ludwig Baumann & Co., 2 T.C.M. 188 (1943). Cf. Ruben v. Commissioner,

(8th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 926.
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poration in exchange for the bonds in question.146 Secondly, and even
more important, there was no evidence whatever that the general philosophy of the Kirby case actually depended on the original receipt of
an asset by the debtor. In fact, its author, Justice Holmes, culminated
in that opinion his ten-year-old attack on the confining principles of
Eisner v. Macomber by dismissing the authority of the latter case with
the statement, "We see nothing to be gained by the discussion of judicial definitions."147 This is not to say, however, that the lower courts
would be warranted in taking the position that the saving involved in
every bargain discharge could be taxed without regard to the character of
the original transaction out of which the obligation arose. Consider, for
example, the case first mentioned-the debtor who discharged at a saving a judgment suffered as a consequence of his own negligence. The
philosophy of the Kerbaugh-Empire Co. case would clearly seem to immunize the saving in question. For it would be wholly illogical to attach significance to a loss of the asset after its receipt if a loss which
gave rise to the obligation in the first instance is to be treated as a neutral
factor. This reasoning would not, of course, support the result in the
Rail Joint Co. case, for there no such loss appeared.
Even if the principle of the Rail Joint Co. case is eventually confirmed, there is still a real possibility, though dry logic might point to
the contrary, that its doctrine will be limited to those cases involving
a complete absence of consideration in money's worth. In other words,
it is quite possible that it will be so construed as to preclude admission
of proof offered by a debtor in connection with the original arms-length
transaction to the effect that the consideration in money's worth which
he actually received on incurring the obligation was at that ti:me worth
less than the face amount of the debt. While there is some slight author_ity to the contrary,1 48 the Supreme Court has on occasion at least shown
146 Surrey, "The Revenue Act of 1939 and the Income Tax Treabnent of Cancellation of Indebtedness," 49 YALE L.J. 1153 at 1175 (1940).
147 284 U.S. 1 at 3, 52 S.Ct. 4 (1931). Justice Holmes followed his dissent in Eisner
v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920), by joining with Justice Brandeis and
new appointees to the Court in the so-called Reorganization Cases. It was in these decisions
that the implications of the Macomber decision were first read down. Marr v. United States,
268 U.S. 536, 45 S.Ct. 575 (1925); Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 44 S.Ct. 490 (1924);
Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134, 43 S.Ct. 495 (1923); Rockefeller v. United States,
257 U.S. 176, 42 S.Ct. 68 (1921); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 42 S.Ct. 63
(1921).
148 See Corporacion de Ventas de Salitre y Yoda de Chile v. Commissioner, (2d Cir.
1942) 130 F. (2d) 141; Kramon Development Co., 3 T.C. 342 (1944). Contra, Sacramento Medico Dental Building Co., 47 B.T.A. 314 (1942). Cf. American Smelting &
Refining Co. v. United States, (2d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 883. It should be noted that
each one of these cases involved the issuance of corporate bonds for property. In view of
the frequency with which such bonds ari: issued at a discount, a stronger argument can be
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a reluctance to impose on the government the exceedingly burdensome
task of checking valuations.149 But again, the matter must be spoken of
in terms of possibilities, for the high Court's attitude on the valuation
problem has actually vascillated over the years.100
Significance of the fact that the consideration received was a deductible expense. At first blush it would seem that the original receipt
by the debtor of valuable benefits other than non-deductible assets
would also satisfy the requirements imposed by the Rail Joint Co. decision, thus leaving any saving effected by a bargain discharge of the
debt fully taxable under the Kirby doctrine. For example, obligations
incurred by an accrual taxpayer for services of one kind or another,
whether personal or involving the use of a building or money, have,
in common with the bonds which were issued for cash in the Kirby
case, the characteristic of being supported by consideration running to
the debtor in money's worth. In spite of this similarity, however, the
full force of the Kirby doctrine has not been brought to bear on bargain
discharges of indebtedness in those instances where the debt had previously given rise to a deduction. This difference in treatment is due at
least in part to the fact that the gains derived from the bargain discharge
of such obligations have always been taxed under a doctrine which was
quite independent of the Kirby case.
At a very early date, indeed, at the time it was believed by lower
courts that the Kerbaugh-Empire Co. case immunized savings from
bargain discharges, the Maryland Casualty Co.151 doctrine was sometimes relied upon to justify a tax on such a saving if the deduction
which was taken when the obligation was incurred had offset other income.152 In a sense it could be said that the debtor was merely being
required to restore in the year of the discharge the earlier income which
was offset "in order that the returns for both years might truly reflect
made in such cases for a rule which would require the use of the value of the property
received instead of the face amount than could be made in the situation where an ordinary
obligation is incurred by an ordinary debtor.
149 Helvering

v. Midland Mutual Life Insurance Co., 300 U.S. 216, 57 S.Ct. 423

(1937).

150 Ibid. Cf. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 60 S.Ct. 631 (1940).
151 Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 40 S.Ct. 155
152 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 13 B.T.A. 988 (1928),

(1920).
affd. (7th
Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 990, cert. den. 284 U.S. 618, 52 S.Ct. 7 (1931). Other decisions
of this period, however, thought the Kerbaugh-Empire Co. case immunized the gain from
a cancellation even though the earlier deduction involved a tax benefit. John F. Campbell
Co., 15 B.T.A. 458 (1929), affd. (D.C. Cir. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 487; National Sugar
Manufacturing Co., 7 B.T.A. 577 (1927). Those who dissented in the former case were
alone in recognizing that the doctrine which sprang from the Maryland Casualty Co. case
was quite independent of the Kerbaugh-Empire Co. decision.
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the effect of the whole transaction upon the net income."153 Then
when the Kirby case did finally authorize the taxation of savings from
bargain discharges in general, the notion developed that this simply
furnished an additional reason for the particular tax which had been
previously sanctioned by the Maryland Casualty Co. doctrine.154 In
other words, the Kirby case was not interpreted, as it might have been,
so as to render foreign to the matter of taxability the question of whether
or not the deduction taken in an earlier return had involved a tax benefit. In accordance then with the negative implications of the Maryland Casualty Co. doctrine,155 even though the service received by an
accrual taxpayer on incurring an obligation was of value, any saving on
the subsequent discharge of that obligation was considered immune by
the lower courts unless· the earlier deduction for the expense had actually offset taxable income.156
Piecemeal acceptance by the Congress of the foregoing rule was
followed by an even more sweeping capitulation on the part of the
Treasury. The earliest statutory authority approving this limitation
on the applicability of the Kirby case was section 270 and its counterparts in the Bankruptcy Act. 157
·
. It will be recal~ed that under the original language of these sections,
any corporation which secured temporary immunity from the Kirby
doctrine by virtue of a pending Chapter X reorganization was required
to reduce the basis of its property by the amount of the saving which
it effected from the discharge or modification of its indebtedness. This
tax deferment formula gave way to complete tax immunity, however,
to the extent the obligation involved "accrued interest unpaid and not
resulting in a tax benefit on any income tax return." Subsequent revision of this section has not affected this limitation.
153 Commissioner v.
154 For example, in

Rail Joint Co., (2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 751 at 752.
Consolidated Gas Co. of Pittsburgh, 24 B.T.A. 901 (1931), the
Board of Tax Appeals, after relying on the Kirby case to justify the exaction, stated at p.
905: "Furthermpre, since it had previously deducted the full amount of the interest, it
should restore to income the difference between that amount and the amount which it
actually had to pay."
155 The negative side of the tax oenefit doctrine was as a general proposition formally
launched in Central Loan and Investment Co., 39 B.T.A. 981 (1939). But that case said
that it had always been implicit in the Marylan~ Casualty Co. doctrine that an item which
was recouped was immune if the earlier deduction was of no tax benefit. This conclusion
was :lirst carried over into cancellation cases in Barnhart-Morrow Consolidated, 47 B.T.A.
590 (1942), amended in 2 T.C.M. 635 (1943), affd. (9th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 285.
156 Warner Co., 11 T.C. 419 (1948), affd. (3d Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 599; C.
Ludwig Baumann & Co., 2 T.C.M. 188 (1943); Chenango Textile Corporation, 1 T.C.
147 (1942), revd., in part on other grounds (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 296; BarnhartMorrow Consolidated, 47 B.T.A. 590 (1942), amended in 2 T.C.M. 635 (1943), affd.
(9th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 285.
157 See discussion in Part I of this article, 49 lvhcH. L. REv. 459 at 485 (1951).
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This provision in the Bankruptcy Act was followed in 1942 by the
codification in the Internal Revenue Code of the tax benefit rule to
the extent, according to section 22(b)(l2), that it concerned the
"recovery" of bad debts, prior taxes, and delinquency amounts.158 This
was followed in 1943 by Dobson v. Conimissioner,1 59 a decision of the
Supreme Court which, to say the least, did not disapprove of the Tax
Court's application of this equitable principle on an even more ·widespread basis than that provided in the code. This action was in turn
followed in 1945 by a sweeping amendment1° 0 of the regulation which
had been issued in connection with section 22(b)(l2).161 This provided that "the rule of exclusion so prescribed by statute applies equally
with respect to all other losses, expenditures, and accruals made the
basis of deductions from gross income for prior taxable years ... but not
including deductions with respect to depreciation, depletion, amortization, or amortizable bond premiums." The fact that "recovery" is defined to include cancellation perhaps explains why reference is made
in so many recent cases to the fact that the commissioner concedes that
a cancellation of a matter which was previously deductible involves
income only to the extent there was tax benefit from the earlier deduction.162
This limitation on the theory of the Kirby case is something in the
nature of a judicial counterpart on a transaction basis of the statutory
net loss carry-over provision. The philosophy underlying the latter,
that it is inequitable to compute income taxes solely by reference to the
transactions occurring in any one year, also furnishes a rationale for
the former. Any evaluation of this judicially imposed limitation must
recognize, however, that it does provide the same treatment taxwise
for those debtors whose previous deduction was without tax benefit
whether they secure a partial cancellation or pay their obligations in
full. Moreover, such debtors who do secure a partial cancellation enjoy a tax advantage over those whose obligations arise out of the purchase of assets which were not deductible in the first instance. While
these.comparisons might argue against the validity of this notion, there
is a competing analogy which is based on the implications of this same
thesis of like treatment for economically similar situations. If one
should be taxed for a bargain discharge, though an earlier deduction
158 Act of Oct. 21, 1942, c. 619, §ll6(a), 56 Stat. L. 798, 26 U.S.C. (1946)
§22(b)(l2).
159 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943).
100T.D. 5454, 1945-1 Cum. Bul. 68.
101 Treas. Reg. Ill, §29.22(b)(12)-l(a).
.
162 Securities Co. v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 85 F. Supp. 532; Warner Co.,
11 T.C. 419 (1948), affd. (3d Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 599.
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did not actually offset income, then should not a debtor whose deduction was of tax benefit be taxed twice on a subsequent bargain discharge? In other words, should the latter debtor be taxed once for the
income previously offset which is now restored, and taxed again on the
difference between the issue price and the cost of discharge? The fact
that there is actually but one economic gain in such a situation is some
proof that the rule which developed out of the Maryland Casualty Co.
case is quite satisfactory.

Signi-ficance of those matters, involving the consideration, which
arose a~er the obligation was incurred. Any number of things can happen to the valuable consideration which a debtor received on incurring
an obligation. However, examination of the more frequently recurring
possibilities will suffice to point up the extent to which, and the rationale by which, such matters have been linked to savings from bargain
discharges of the original indebtedness, the whole being considered
one indivisible transaction for tax purposes.
The first of these possibilities has already been mentioned. It concerns the case where cash received by the debtor was subsequently lost
in the particular venture for which the money was borrowed. While the
conclusion in the Kerbaugh-Empire Co. case, that this loss left the
subsequent saving immune, can hardly be reconciled with the combined effects of the Sanford & Brooks Co.163 and Kirby decisions, its
result, nevertheless, seems to have survived164 with the Supreme Court
effecting a reconciliation more or less vi et armis.165
It might seem to follow from the Kerbaugh-Empire Co. case that,
where the consideration consists of property of unliquidated value
which is still held by the debtor at the time he effects a saving by a
bargain discharge of the debt, the tax on such saving should be postponed until such time as it can be determined whether the transaction
as a whole will result in a gain or in a loss. This question, insofar
as it related to purchase-money mortgage situations, first came before the
Board of Tax Appeals in American Chicle Co.,1 66 a case disposed of by
the board during the period when it thought the Kerbaugh-Empire Co.
case completely freed from tax all savings from bargain discharges.167
163 Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 150
164 See e.g. William H. Coverdale, 4 T.C.M. 713 (1945).
165 See discussion in Part I of this article, 49 MICH. L. REv.

(1931).

459 at 464 (1951).
See also Helvering v. American Chicle Co., 291 U.S. 426, 54 S.Ct. 460 (1934). In Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 69 S.Ct. 358 (1949), the point was clearly established
that the burden was on the taxpayer to show the actual loss incurred.
166 23 B.T.A. 221 (1931).
167 See discussion in Part I of this article, 49 MrcH. L. REv. 459 at 461 (1951).
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A decision which at the very least called for deferment of assessment on
the saving effected by the discharge of the mortgage was not, therefore,
surprising. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however,
reached a like result on appeal though the spell of the Kerhaugh-Empire Co. case had in the meantime been partly broken by the Supreme
Court's intervening decision in the Kirby case.168
The circuit court, by treating the retention of the consideration as
an integral part of the bond transaction, concluded in the language
which follows that the saving operated only to reduce the purchase price
of the property:
"But if he buys property by an obligation in the form of a
bond, note or the like, and if it remains in kind after the debt is
paid, there can be no 'gain'. The cost has indeed been definitely
settled, but that is only one term of the equation; as long as the
other remains at large, there is no 'realized' gain."169
·
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the record did not actually disclose whether or not the debtor had retained the property, and,
· accordingly, whether or not he had "lost or gained by the transaction."170 Another of its statements is of equal importance in evaluating
the decision. In distinguishing the Kerhaugh-Empire Co. case, the
Court concluded:
"The final outcome of the dealings [there] was revealed-the
taxpayer suffered a loss. Here, for aught we know, there was substantial profit-certainly, the record does not show thecontrary."171
It was not wholly clear from this analysis which of three general
propositions the Court was prepared to sustain. It might have meant
that the loss in the Kerhaugh-Empire Co. case was "revealed" in the
sense that it had been fully realized, and that only in such event would
losses in value of the property purchased be taken into account. Or, at
the other extreme, the Court might yet say that proof of continued retention of the original property was alone enough to require a deferment, the amount of the saving being treated in such case as a reduction in the purchase price. Finally, intermediate positions of various
types were left open; these had in common the fact that deferment
would be called for only where the retained property had decreased in
value.
168 Commissioner

v. American Chicle Co., (2d Cir. 1933) 65 F. (2d) 454.

1so Id. at 455.

170 Hdvering
171 Ibid.

v. American Chicle Co., 291 U.S. 426 at 430, 54 S.Ct. 460 (1934).
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The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation Corporation172 split over the proper construction to
be imputed to the American Chicle Co. decision, a majority siding either
with the first or perhaps with one shade of the third of the three previously mentioned interpretations. In any event it concluded, in contradiction to the second of those interpretations, that a debtor could be·
taxed even though at the time the debt was discharged he still retained
the property which had been subject to the purchase money mortgage.
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, reached the opposite result
on the slightly different facts presented by Hirsch v. Commissioner. 173
Its opinion concluded somewhat ambiguously-either in accordance
with the second or with the third possible interpretation of the Chicle
Co. decision-that the taxpayer's "gain or loss cannot be determined
until liquidation of his capital investment."174
The failure of these two possibly conflicting opinions to define precisely the exact basis upon which they rested left the way open for reconciliation of their opposing results on the basis of two possible factual
distinctions. The first of these concerned possible differences in the
subject matter of the negotiations which were conducted by the parties.
In the Coastwise case, where the debtor had been held taxable, "the
parties dealt solely about the notes and their value and not about the
ships or their value."175 Consequently, the court refused to treat the
saving as one intended to reflect an adjustment of the original purchase
price of the ships. In the Hirsch case, however, while the conclusion
that the negotiations resulted in a reduction in the purchase price was
not compelled by any fair appraisal of the facts, neither was that conclusion wholly unrealistic since the creditor, after turning down an offer
to accept the property itself in final settlement, did accept in cash an
amount exactly equal to its value. In view of these differences, it was
possible to reconcile the two cases by attributing their decisions to the
differences in the intent of the respective parties. The question of
whether the negotiations were addressed to a revision of the original
purchase price would under this view furnish the controlling·principle.
The second factual difference between the two cases involved
their financial aspects. While the unrealized loss in the Coastwise
Transportation Corporation case was more than the saving effected by
112 71 F. (2d) 104 (1934), cert. den. 293 U.S. 595, 55 S.Ct. ll0 (1934).
173 ll5 F. (2d) 656 (1940).
174 Id. at 658.
175 Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation Corp., (1st Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d)

at 105.

104
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the bargain discharge, the value of the property still remained more
than equal to the unadjusted balance owing immediately before the
discharge. On the other hand, while the unrealized loss in the Hirsch
decision was also more than the subsequent saving, the property involved had decreased in value to a point where it was worth less than
the balance owing, its value being exactly equal to the balance of the
debt as adjusted. Though it was not possible to reconcile the two cases
on what might be described as an "offset" theory, since the unrealized
losses in both cases would more than offset the respective savings, the
cases could be reconciled by a rule which applied a "reduction in purchase price" theory either in those cases where the property was worth
less than the unadjusted balance owing, or, of course, where its value
was no more than the balance owing after adjustment.
The differences between these two cases have given rise to several
views. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, while characterizing the reduction in purchase price theory as "irrational," concluded that
it applied only where the debtor and his vendor dealt specifically with
respect to the purchase price.176 It was not applicable therefore to those
cases where the negotiations involved only the debt, or to those situations where the bargain purchase of the obligation was made on the
open market. Other lower courts, however, have applied the reduction
theory "regardless of whether the minds of the parties met upon the exact nature of the transaction,"1 77 a decrease in the value of the property
below a certain fixed standard being treated instead as the criterion.178
But in those instances where this tendency was reflected, it has not
always been clear exactly how much decrease was r_equired in order
to bring the rule into operation.
On occasion the rule providing for reduction in basis rather than
immediate taxability is so stated as to call for its application whenever
the property has decreased in value "to a point where it does not exceed the unpaid balance of the purchase price."179 Presumably this
176 Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street Corp. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1944) 147 F.
(2d) 453.
177 Commissioner v. Sherman, (6th Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 68 a~ 70, affirming 44
B.T.A. 853 (1941).
178 Some courts, while not requiring that the minds of the parties meet on the exact
nature of the transaction, have stressed the fact that the cancellation was effected by direct
negotiations', thus distinguishing the Coastwise Transportation case where the negotiations
were conducted through an intermediary. Helvering v. A. L. Killian Co., (8th Cir. 1942)
128 F. (2d) 433; Gehring Publishing Co., 1 T.C. 345 (1942).
179 Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street Corporation, 2 T.C. 516 (1943), remanded in
(2d Cir. 1944) 147 F. (2d) 453. See also Commissioner v. Sherman, (6th Cir. 1943) 135
F. (2d) 68.

678

MrcmGAN LAw REvrnw

[ Vol. 49

had reference to the balance owing before adjustment. There is nothing in the Hirsch case which would contradict this. In one instance,
however, the Tax Court specifically concluded that the balance owing
after adjustment furnished one side of the equation.180
On the whole the criteria which have evolved from the differences
in the Coastwise Transportation Corporation and Hirsch cases seem to
be quite unsatisfactory. Why should the intention of the parties or the
language which they use in effecting the settlement govern the selection of the point at which income is realized?181 Of greater importance
is the fact that the connection between the modification of a purchase
money mortgage and the original purchase price is as intimate as was
the connection between the loss and the saving which were involved in
the Kerhaugh-Empire Co. case.182 The fact that the Supreme Court
treated the two matters in the latter case as one indivisible transaction
without inquiring into the matter of intention suggests that the same
practice should be followed in the purchase money mortgage situation
under discussion.183
Nor is there any justification for turning the application of the reduction in purchase price theory on the question of whether the property has decreased in value to a point below either the adjusted or the
unadjusted balance owing. Apart from the fact that both of these matters are wholly foreign to the basic question of whether the saving on
the debt retirement and the original purchase are so related as to constitute one indivisible transaction, is the further fact that the first of these
standards, the adjusted basis, bears no relationship whatever to the
amount of the gain, i.e., to the amount cancelled.184 And the second is
capable of requiring tax deferment in situations where the debtor presently has an overall unrealized gai~ as well as where he has an overall
W. Gwinn, 3 T.C.M. 548 (1944).
is greater justification for attaching controlling significance to intention when
the adjustment is made in accordance with an agreement entered into at the time of the
purchase. Main Properties, Inc., 4 T.C. 364 (1944); Pinkney Packing Co., 42 B.T.A.
823 (1940).
182 And in any event, wouldn't the facts of life suggest that a mortgagee would
usually have one eye on the present value of his security thou0i negotiations toward a
settlement may be couched in terms of a reduction of the indebtedness.
183 According to this thesis, the depreciation deductions which the debtor may have
been taking will be reduced by virtue of the reduction in adjusted basis.
184 For example, it is conceivable that the debtor might be immediately taxable on
$100,000 simply because the value of the property exceeds the adjusted balance owing by
$1,000. There was no jndication in the Gwinn case, 3 T.C.M. 548 (1944), that the value
of the property established a ceiling on the amount of taxable income. Such a ceiling is
established, of course, where the unadjusted balance owing furnishes one side of the
equation.
180 Ralph
181 There
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unrealized loss.185 Under these circumstances why should a borderline
shift of $5 in the value of the property be responsible for a .finding of
immediate taxability of a very large gain or, in the alternative, deferment which in the end might under some circumstances amount to
complete forgiveness?
If any of these purchase mqney mortgage situations are to be treated
as one transaction, all should be. That would mean, of course, that
the Coastwise Transportation Corporation case was wrongly decided.
It would be equally fair, as an alternative to the foregoing suggestion, to utilize an offset theory, i.e., compare the unrealized loss, if any,
with the realized gain from the debt retirem<::nt, taxing any excess gain.
The philosophy behind the legislative solution to the doctrine of Helvering v. Bruun186 would, however, favor the first of these methods, for by it
the burdensome valuation question is avoided.
The Supreme Court has not gone beyond tacitly approving some
form of the reduction in purchase price theory. It referred to this general doctrine and its supporting decisions in the American Dental Co.
case while relating the adjustment of a debtor's back rent and interest
to a gift:
"The release of interest or the complete satisfaction of an indebtedness by partial payment by the voluntary act of the creditor
is more akin to a reduction of sale price than to financial betterment
through the purchase ... of its bonds in an arms-length transaction."181
The effect of the American Dental Co. decision on the matter under
discussion was not limited, of course, to this passing reference. Adjustments of indebtedness which would have otherwise called for a reduction in purchase price would now, if subject to this decision, be
treated as gifts which are free of the reduction in basis burden.188 But
the Jacobson decision,1 89 as previously explained,100 has, of course, cut
down on the number of situations which are likely to be subsumed under the American Dental Co. principle.
The question naturally arises-if some reduction in purchase price
theory is to be used, how far is it to be carried? Should it be confined, for
185 This may occur when the unadjusted balance owing is reduced from a point in
excess of the value of the property to a point below that value, the reduction exceeding the
amount previously paid.
186 309 U.S. 461, 60 S.Ct. 631 (1940). See I.R.C. §22(b)(ll).
181318 U.S. 322 at 330, 63 S.Ct. 577 (1943).
188 Chenango Textile Corporation v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 296.
1so 336 U.S. 28, 69 S.Ct. 358 (1949).
190 Part I of this article, 49 Mica. L. REv. 459 at 472 (1951).
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example, to purchase money mortgage situations? If the doctrine depends upon the philosophy of the Kerbaugh-Empire Co. case, then it
should apply not only to the purchase money mortgage situations properly so-called, but also to those cases where money is borrowed from
X to buy property from Y, since that situation would roughly parallel
the facts of that Supreme Court decision.191 It should not apply, however, to that property already held by the debtor which is used by him
for collateral in securing a loan which is subsequently adjusted, the
borrowed money still being retained. For to embrace the latter situation
would subsume three matters (the mortgaged property, the cancellation, and the retained cash) within one transaction rather than the two
previously approved by the Kerbaugh-Empire Co. case. The latter
would authorize immunity for the saving only to the extent the borrowed money itself has been lost. But the underpinnings of that case
will not, in the light of the Sanford & Brooh Co. decision, support the
extension which would be required if account is to be taken of both the
borrowed money and the mortgaged property. The limitation suggested
seems to be supported by the trend of authorities.192
Signi-ficance of the Nature of the Debtor's Obligation

The lower courts have been rather slow in applying the principle
of the Kirby decision to obligations lacking in any one of the three
qualities of the debt discharged there. That claim involved the undisputed, unconditional, personal liability of the Kirby Lumber Company.
This reluctance was fully justified with respect to disputed or contingent liabilities, and perhaps even with respect to obligations lacking personal liability; but the further requirement that the personal liability also
be of a particular type is in certain instances open to serious question.
The Kirby doctrine could not, of course, be applied to cash settlements of disputed claims unless the court reviewing the tax question
were willing to determine what the actual rights of the parties would
have been in the absence of the compromise. From the beginning, the
Board of Tax Appeals has very wisely avoided this task, seeming to
recognize that a test of good faith was an adequate safeguard against
self-serving declarations which might have been designed to avoid
191 Charles L. Nutter, 7 T.C. 480 (1946). The Third Circuit has, however, refused
to apply the Hirsch formula to a mortgage which had simply replaced the original purchase
money mortgage. Frank v. United States, (3d Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 864. This is
directly contrary to the Hirsch case which actually involved just such a situation. (7th Cir.
1940) 115 F. (2d) 656.
192 Frank v. United States, (3d Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 864. Cf. Lutz & Schramm
Co., 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
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subjection of a given situation to the Kirby principle.193 But a different
tax consequence should be applied to settlements of disputed claims
effected by the transfer of property which carries with it an adjusted
basis under section 113(b). \iVhere the transfer is not preceded by a
liquidation of the disputed claim the debtor should be taxable on the
difference between the adjusted basis and the market value of the property, since he is deriving full benefit from that difference in effecting
the discharge.194 It is not likely, however, that this result will be
reached so long as General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering,1° 15
a case discussed below, stands unreversed.196
Much more difficult valuation problems than those which would be
encountered in the foregoing situation have been quite properly avoided in those cases decided to date where the conclusion has been reached
that the Kirby principle will not be applied to the settlement of contingent claims by payments in cash.197 It should be noted, however,
that the relevant decided cases actually involved contingencies, the likelihood of which admittedly could not be measured. This suggests that
there is still room, sweeping dicta to the contrary notwithstanding, for
the opposite conclusion in cases where, for example, experience tables
will furnish a sufficiently accurate valuation of the claim.
The discussion above with reference to transfers of property other
than cash in discharge of a disputed claim is equally applicable where
the transfer is in discharge of a contingent claim.
The third feature of the obligation involved in the Kirby case, the
matter of personal liability, has been the separate subject of two basic
types of controversies. The first of these involved taxpayers who were
not personally liable but whose property was subject to the debt. Contrasted with this, in the second, the taxpayer disclaimed tax liability
though personally liable for the obligation, charging that his economic
benefit was immune from tax since it was derived from a discharge effected in the precise manner permitted or called for by the terms of the
obligation. In other words, whereas the first of the two taxpayers
claimed immunity from tax by reason of the complete absence of per193 N. Sobel, Inc., 40 B.T.A. 1263 (1939); Iceland, Inc., 23 B.T.A. 15 (1931); but
cf. Pacific Magnesium, Inc. v. Westover, (D.C. Cal. 1949) 86 F. Supp. 644. It was in the
first of these cases that the board emphasized the bona fide character of the dispute.
194 The discussion infra p. 686 et seq., suggests that this gain would be truced, if at
all, on the theory that it was derived from the disposition of property rather than from the
cancellation or bargain discharge of a debt.
195296 U.S. 200, 56 S.Ct. 185 (1935).
196 Cf. Commissioner v. Sherman, (6th Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 68.
197 Corporacion de Ventas de Salitre y Yoda de Chile v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1942)
130 F. (2d) 141; Terminal Investment Co., 2 T.C. 1004 (1943).
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sohal liability on his part, the second relied on the peculiar quality of his
admitted personal liability.
While the first cases coming before the Board of Tax Appeals involved the first of the two situations, one aspect of the second was also·
present. Taxpayers who had purchased property subject to a mortgage
secured its release, as they were authorized to do, by turning in to the
mortgagee at face value the latter's own certificates of indebtedness
which the taxpayer-mortgagor had purchased at a discount.108 Some of
the mortgagees' certificates were actually secured by the particular mortgage on the mortgagor-debtors' properties199 and some apparently were
not.200
The board might have sustained the government's position in these
cases, with respect to the theoretical gain represented by the difference
between the purchase price of the certificates (adjusted basis) and the
amount of debt retired, on the theory that to the extent indicated specific
property previously offset by an obligation was now released to the debtor's uses without cost, thus rendering the gain subject to the basic philosophy of the Kirby case. Or it could have, as it later did in cases where
the mortgaged property itself was transferred in discharge of the debt, 201
characterized the gain ~s one realized from the disposition of property,
the property in this case, however, being the mortgagee's certificates.
Or finally, recognizing that the taxpayer was not personally liable for
the debt and that, as a consequence, a conveyance of the mortgaged
property itself (perhaps through foreclosure) would have satisfied all
that the law required of a lienor, the board might have coupled with one
of the above two theories a ceiling to be called into operation whenever
the value of the mortgaged property had fallen below the amount owing
on the mortgage.
Instead of these theories, however, the absence of personal liability
on the part of the debtor led the board to conclude that the Kirby principle was inapplicable and that the purchase price of the certificates was
simply to be added to the actual consideration previously paid for the
property, thus establishing its unadjusted basis. Underlying this conclusion was the notion that the ta:\.'l)ayer had first purchased only an
equity in the property, and that the cost of the remaining interest could
not be determined until he had completed negotiations for it. Conse10s Hotel Astoria, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 759 (1940); P. J. Hiatt, 35 B.T.A.
Fulton Gold Corp., 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934); American Seating Co., 14 B.T.A.
revd. in part on other grounds (7th Cir. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 681.
199P. J. Hiatt, 35 B.T.A. 292 (1937); American Seating Co., 14 B.T.A.
200 Hotel Astoria, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 759 (1940).
201 Mendham Corp., 9 T.C. 320 (1947); Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 'T.C.

292 (1937);
328 (1928),
328 (1928).
682 (1943).
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quently, the tax effect on each of the debtors was deferred in much the
same manner, though on a more sweeping basis than it would have
been under the doctrine of Hirsch v. Commissioner. 202
This result, while quite satisfactory in the instance where the lien
was roughly akin to a purchase money mortgage, is less tenable in the
case where the debtor received cash to do with as he pleased in exchange
for the mortgage. For there the net gain in cash would be fully realized
on the bargain discharge of the debt. 203 While the above cases were
not required to draw the distinction in question, recent results in related situations furnish some reason to believe that debtors of this sort
will be said to have realized income on the bargain discharge of liens
for which they were not personally liable. 204 Indeed a recent decision
by one of the circuits was basically contrary to the results which the
board reached in the cases discussed in the preceding paragraph. 205 The
circuit court apparently thought that the Kirby case was applicable
in all such cases simply because of the consequent release of specific
property previously offset by an obligation.
As previously indicated, the second major type of controversy concerning the importance of personal liability involved situations where
personal liability of one sort was actually present. Difficulty was encountered in applying the Kirby principle only because of an option in
the debtor, arising out of the original terms of the obligation, to pay
in cash or in certificates of indebtedness running against the creditor.
In the first such case, one involving a purchase money mortgage, the
board initially indicated that the Kirby principle was inapplicable because the taxpayer, though permitted to discharge the debt with bonds
of the creditor which the former had purchased at a discount, had done
all that he was obliged to do. 206 Present immunity was attributed then
to the fact that the debtor had not actually compromised or adjusted his
obligation with the creditor. Presumably, as in the situation first disSee discussion supra p. 676 et seq.
does not mean that the doctrine under discussion would be inapplicable to all
cases involving liens which attached after the property was first acquired. For that doctrine
has been applied to such a case where the lien arose out of a special assessment by a local
unit of government. P. J. Hiatt, 35 B.T.A. 292 (1937). Contra, John Clauss, 1936 P-H
B.T.A. Memo. Op. 36,030. Instances of that type are quite properly assimilated since the
expense involved does increase the adjusted basis of the property, and the lien, therefore, is
roughly akin to a purchase money mortgage.
2 04 Mendham Corp., 9 T.C. 320 (1947); Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
205 Central Paper Co. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1946) 158 F. (2d) 131. Those
cases were also recently approved by way of dictum in Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street
Corp., (2d Cir. 1944) 147 F. (2d) 453.
2 06 Cherokee Co., 41 B.T.A. 1212 (1940); cf. Pinkney Packing Co., 42 B.T.A. 823
(1940).
202

203 This
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cussed, the adjusted basis of the debtor's property would now include,
aside from previous cash payments, only the amount actually expended
for the bonds and not the face amount of the debt which was retired
by them. 207
By an alternative line of reasoning, the board evolved a second
formula which will produce in many cases results quite different from
those which would have followed from the foregoing analysis. The
transaction was also said to resemble sufficiently an exchange to warrant
its classification as such. The original cash payments and the bonds
were said in effect to have been exchanged for the mortgaged property.
Accordingly, a debtor will be immediately subject to tax if the value
of the mortgaged property at the time of its original acquisition exceeded
his cash payments plus the cost price of the creditor's bonds which
were turned in. In other words, if at the time of its acquisition the
property was actually worth the cash payment plus the face amount of
the mortgage, the difference between the cost of the creditor's certificates and the amount of debt retired by them would, while immune
under the Kirby doctrine, in effect represent the amount of gain to be
taxed on the theory of an exchange. Subsequent confirmation of the
exchange theory by way of dictum indicates that it is likely to supplant
the rationale first mentioned. 208 At the same time, however, the Tax
Court held that neither of the above theories applied to personal liability cases involving optional methods of retirement if the mortgage was
not on the property at the time it was acquired. The Second Circuit
confirmed the Tax Court's view ,that in the latter circumstances the
Kirby case was applicable.209 This resul.t seems sound enough, for the
exchange theory could not accurately characterize the transaction.
The suggestion that the exchange theory seems in the one instance
to have supplanted the notion that a debtor was free of tax liability
where he had done all that he was obliged to do should not be understood to mean that all vitality has been sapped from the latter reasoning.
Indeed, the results in two other types of situations have been greatly influenced by this notion and debtors as a consequence have been freed
from tax though they actually enjoyed some sort of gain.
The first of these situations concerns the case where a corporation
declares a dividend in kind of appreciated property which carries an
adjusted basis under section I 13(b). Where that distribution was not
207 However, if the courts should apply the doctrine of General Utilities & Operating
Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 56 S.Ct. 185 (1935), a reduction in basis might not be
required.
20s Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street Corporation, 2 T.C. 516 (1943).
200 (2d Cir. 1944) 147 F. (2d) 453.
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in discharge of a previously declared liquidated dividend, the Board of
Tax Appeals, 210 and later the Supreme Court,211 held the corporation
immune with respect to the appreciation. The fact that the actual distribution was not in the form of a sale or was not actually in discharge of
an obligation of a greater amount was thought to be enough to justify
the immunity.
While it is not likely that the lower courts will tamper with the result in this exact situation so long as the Supreme Court's decision in
General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering stands unreversed, one
circuit has recently sustained the Treasury in a case where the distribution was made of prope~ty which carried a zero basis. 212 There, however, the circuit court did utilize a formula which would postpone the
tax against the corporation until such time as the stockholders disposed
of the property. Because the entire proceeds from their disposition
would have been income had the sale been consummated by the corporation itself, the situation was related to the so-called "taxable person"
cases, particularly to Helvering v. Horst, 213 rather than to the Kirby
line of decisions. Consequently, the corporation was held taxable on
the theory that, by the distribution to its stockholders and their subsequent sale, it had derived or realized full enjoyment of the economic
gain. Eventually, perhaps the notion which has been developed most
fully in the taxable person cases, that when not received in "money or
property realization may occur when the last step is taken by which one
obtains the fruition of the economic gain,"214 will be called upon by the
Supreme Court to justify a reversal of its General Utilities decision.
There are equally good reasons for reversing the result reached in
the second of the two situations which have escaped all tax consequence by reason of the notion that the taxpayer satisfied the obligation
exactly according to its terms. That situation, one where a debtor derives a gain, after obtaining a loan in foreign money, by repaying it in
kind with coin purchased under a more favorable exchange rate, is so
similar in its economic consequence to a tax-producing short sale that
immunity from tax is without any justification whatever. 215 While
210
211

General Utilities & Operating Co., 29 B.T.A. 934 (1934).
General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 56 S.Ct. 185

(1935).
212 First State Bank of Stratford v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 1004,
cert. den. 335 U.S. 867, 69 S.Ct. 137 (1948).
21s 311 U.S. 112, 61 S.Ct. 144 (1940).
214 Id. at 115.
2 15 Cf. William H. Coverdale, 4 T.C.M. 713 (1945); B.F. Goodrich Co., 1 T.C.
1098 (1943); General Motors Corp., 35 B.T.A. 523 (1937), revd. by stipulation of parties
(6th Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 995.
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there is no adjustment of the obligation with the creditor, and no appreciation in the purchased foreign funds which might be said to have been
realized on its disposition, there is no earthly reason why the underlying philosophy of the Kirby case should not be extended to cover it.
Signi-ficance of the Kind of Property Used in Effecting the Discharge
Introductory note. The decided cases reflect two frequently recurring types of bargain discharges which, contrasted with the situation
in the Kirby case, are accompanied by transfers of property other than
partial payments in cash. The first of these involves a transfer by the
debtor of a non-cash asset which carries an adjusted basis under section
1B(b) of the code. The property transferred in the second of the two
situations, while also clearly an asset from the creditor's point of view,
cannot be so characterized, at least in the economic sense, from the
debtor's viewpoint. Illustrative of this second type of transfer is the
case where a corporation issues its own stocks or bonds in discharge of
a pre-existing obligation. These two situations, involving difficulties
slightly different from those encountered in the Kirby case itself, are
discussed below.
Signi-ficance of the use of the debtor's non-cash "assets" in effecting
the discharge. Even in the period when the Kerbaugh-Empire Co.
case216 was thought to preclude the taxation of gains solely attributable
to the bargain discharge of an obligation the Treasury asserted, 217 and
the Board of Tax Appeals agreed,218 that where an asset other than cash
was transferred in discharge of a debt, income was realized by the debtor
to the extent of the difference between the adjusted basis of the property conveyed and the amount of the obligation. That the market value
of the property, a :figure which necessarily constituted one side of the
equation if account was to be taken of a possible bargain discharge,
was considered a neutral factor suggested that such transactions were
really being treated ~s sales. The possibility then of a bargain discharge,
or of a transfer coupled with a partial forgiveness of the indebtedness,
was disregarded.
After the Supreme Court decided the Kirby case, the board added
in substantiation of its "sale" theory with respect to the kind of situation
under discussion the concept which the Supreme Court developed
216 271 U.S. 170, 46 S.Ct. 449 (1926).
211 S.M. 3748, IV-2 Cum. Bul. 17 (1925).
218 Hagan Corporation, 21 B.T.A. 41 (1930).
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there.219 That the measure of the gain continued, however, to be the
difference between the adjusted basis and the amount of the debt and
that the market value of the property remained a neutral factor demonstrated that the basic theory in such cases actually remained one of
sale. 220
There were some situations which might have forced the courts to
choose one or the other of the two competing theories or, in a given case,
to allocate the gain between them. The first of these involved the case
where the debtor was insolvent after as well as before the transfer. It
has been previously noted that debtors so situated were completely immune from the Kirby doctrine. 221 That a debtor so situated might have
forced a selection or allocation between the two theories stemmed from
the fact that an additional difficulty is encountered in justifying such
immunity where "the transaction is treated as if the transferor had sold
the asset for cash equivalent to the amount of the debt and had applied
the cash to the payment of the debt." 222 The difficulty referred to is
fairly obvious; in the case of an ordinary sale, the transferor's net worth
has always been considered a neutral factor in determining whether
the appreciation in the value of the property, realized by sale, constituted taxable income.
Interestingly enough, however, the immunity from the Kirby doctrine presently accorded insolvent debtors can be traced to a circuit
court decision which freed from tax a debtor who had actually transferred appreciated property in discharge of an indebtedness the amount
of which exceeded the market value of the asset transferred as well as its
adjusted basis. 223 Equally interesting is the fact that the court there
omitted any reference to the "sale" theory to which the board subscribed
above, the assumption being made that except for the insolvency of
the debtor the Kirby case would have justified a result favorable to the
government. While the board later conformed to that decision, 224 it
210 Carlisle Packing Co., 29 B.T.A. 514 (1933); E. F. Simms, 28 B.T.A. 988 (1933),
Commissioner's appeal dismissed March 25, 1939.
220 Ibid.
221 See discussion in Part I, 49 MxcH. L. REv. 459 at 478 et seq. (1951).
.
222 The quoted statement appears in Unique Art Manufacturing Co., 8 T.C. 1341
(1947).
223 Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1934) 70
F. (2d) 95.
224 Main Properties, Inc., 4 T.C. 364 (1944); Texas Gas Distributing Co., 3 T.C.
57 (1944); Springfield Industrial Building Co., 38 B.T.A. 1445 (1938). Cf. J. K. McAlpine Land & Development Co., 43 B.T.A. 520 (1941), affd. (9th Cir. 1942) 126 F.
(2d) 163; Estate of W. W. Turney, 1940 P-H B.T.A. Memo. Dec. 40,474, revd. (5th
Cir. 1942) 126 F. (2d) 712.
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continued to emphasize the theory of sale in the case of solvent
debtors. 225
The mission which an insolvent debtor might have accomplished
but did not was eventually performed by a debtor interested in securing
the favorable treatment accorded capital gains. In Peninsula Properties
Co. Ltd.,226 the debtor transferred a capital asset having a market value
and an adjusted basis of $100,000 in discharge of an obligation amounting to $182,188.06. The government insisted that the situation really
involved two transactions, a sale in which gain or loss might have been
realized but was not, and the gratuitous cancellation of a debt of $82,188.06 which, according to the Kirby doctrine, involved the realization
of ordinary income. The Board of Tax Appeals refused, however, to
apply the Kirby doctrine, concluding, for practical purposes, that the
transfer of the property was to be exclusively equated in such instances
with a sale "regardless of the fair market value of the stock,"221 and
that, as a consequence, the realized benefit was a capital gain and not
ordinary income.228
This result, while relieving the government of the burden of checking market values, is not only inconsistent with the philosophy underlying the consequence attached to a showing of insolvency in such cases
but it is at the same time wholly incompatible with the original philoso-.
phy out of which grew a demand for the establishment of the category
of capital gains. That category was created primarily for the purpose of
cushioning the harsh impact of the realization doctrine on appreciations
in value which accrued over a period stretching beyond the taxable
year. If like economic circumstances are to be treated alike, appreciations in value realized by a transfer effected in discharging an obligation
should get the benefit of the effective rate structure provided for capital
gains, but any difference between the market value of the property
transferred and the amount of the debt should by the same token be
considered ordinary income.229
There will be cases, of course, where there is only a slight variance
between the court's notion of market value and the amount of the indebtedness. But the fact that allocation in such instances will hardly
225 International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 310;
Lutz & Schramm Co., l T.C. 682 (1943); Peninsula Properties Co. Ltd., 47 B.T.A. 84
(1942).
220 47 B.T.A. 84 (1942).
221 Id. at 92.
228 Accord, Unique Art Manufacturing Co., 8 T.C. 1341 (1947).
229 That there is some chance that the Tax Court may come around to this view, see
Liberty Mirror Works, 3 T.C. 1018 (1944); Claire D. Reason, 1942 P-H B.T.A.-TC Memo
Dec. 42,552.
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be worth the costs involved should not serve to exclude allocation in
those instances where the parties are aware of substantial differences
in the amounts.
The rule which the lower courts have developed, treating the gain
as one arising entirely out of the disposition of property, has been applied to involuntary2 30 as well as voluntary transfers231 and to those involving mortgaged232 as well as unencumbered assets. Only one such
situation has not been equated with a sale. It will be recalled that where
a debtor pays cash in effecting a bargain discharge of a purchase money
mortgage the courts have in certain instances freed the gain from the
Kirby doctrine by treating the transaction as one involving a reduction
of the original purchase price. 233 In Charles L. Nutter, 234 the property
itself was transferred to the creditor in discharge of the purchase money
obligation. A majority of the Tax Court concluded that this "face to
face'' transaction was also closely akin to, and would be treated as, a reduction in the original price, thus freeing from tax the difference between the adjusted basis and the unpaid balance. 23 ;; The court has not
been inclined, however, to extend this immunity beyond purchase
money mortgage situations properly so-called. 236
Significance of the use of property other than assets in effecting the
discharge. Litigation concerning the effect of transfers of something
other than an asset in effecting bargain discharges of existing indebtedness has dealt almost exclusively with cases involving refunding or
recapitalization programs of corporations, i.e., with instances where
corporate debts are retired through the issuance of the corporation's own
bonds and stocks. The difference in the characteristics of these two
forms of property has given rise to differences in the tax consequence
of cancellations effected by them.
Assets are clearly freed from an offsetting liability in the instance
where the cash proceeds of a new bond issue are used to secure the
bargain discharge of an existing obligation. Consequently, the Kirby
case would sustain a tax imposed in the year in which the gain was real230 R. O'Dell & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1948) 169 F. (2d) 247, affirming
8 T.C. 1165 (1947); Mendham Corp., 9 T.C. 320 (1947).
231 Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
232 Notes 230 and 231 supra.
233 See discussion supra p. 674 et seq.
234 7 T.C. 480 (1946).
235 Four dissenting judges argued that the integrity of the sale theory should be maintained, thus excluding exceptions which had developed in connection with the Kirby doctrine. Certainly the philosophy of Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Insurance Co., 300
U.S. 216, 57 S.Ct. 423 (1937) served to reinforce their contention.
236 Mendham Corp., 9 T.C. 320 (1947); Liberty Mirror Works, 3 T.C. 1018 (1944).
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ized by the discharge. At first blush one might equate with that situation one of those with which we are presently concerned, namely, the
case where bonds having a par value, for example, of $5,000 are issued
directly to a creditor in cancellation of previously outstanding bonds
having a face value of $10,000. At least that analogy was sufficiently
attractive to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that it was led in
Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation Corp. to sustain a tax imposed against such a debtor in the year of the cancellation without any
mention of an almost equally attractive competing method of accounting.237 The competing analogy referred to has its roots in the doctrine
developed for the case where a cash premium is paid by the debtor to a
bondholder on substituting one series of bonds for another. In such a
case the Supreme Court, in accordance with the usual notion that premiums and discounts operate to increase or decrease interest charges,
upheld the Treasury's position that the deduction for the premium could
only be taken on an allocated basis over the life of the new bonds.238
One would suppose from this that a cash premium received (as distinguished from being paid) by debtors on such occasions would be allocated in a similar manner. 239 And the argument might then be made
that the premium received by the Coastwise Transportation Corporation in the release of assets on the occasion of a bargain substitution of
evidences of indebtedness should be accorded like treatment, · ,
While it may yet be decided that the Coastwise Transportation case
did not really consider, and was not therefore definitive on the accounting aspects of such a gain, 240 the arguments would, except for the problem of administrative convenience, actually preponderate on its particular facts in favor of the result which it did reach. The truth of the matter
is that the substantial difference in the face value of the two series of
bonds involved there suggest that the transaction was more closely akin
to forgiveness of a part of the principal than it was to an adjustment of
interest rates. To that extent, though the matter is admittedly one of
those tough questions of degree, the analogy to the Kirby doctrine was
actually more proximate. However, should any such transactions eventually be equated with the cash premium situation, it may as a matter of
administrative convenience be desirable to treat even instances such as
that involved in the Coastwise T r~nsportation case on the same basis. 241
231 (1st

Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 104, cert. den. 293 U.S. 595, 55 S.Ct. 110 (1934).
Great Western Power Co. of California v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 543, 56 S.Ct.
576 (1936).
239 Cf. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-17.,
240 That the Coastwise Transportation case has not been thought to be conclusive on
the accounting aspects, see Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Early, (D.C. Va. 1943) 52 F.
Supp.835.
,
241 Note that Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-17 dealing with premiums and discounts on
238
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Such a solution would serve to avoid the "degree'' aspects of the
problem.
The conclusion that income is realized in the foregoing situation on
either a telescoped or amortized basis leaves open the possible applicability of the non-recognition provisions of the code. In this connection,
only one such provision will be considered here. Some might erroneously conclude that the realized gain in question is actually freed of tax by
virtue of that provision which calls for non-recognition where an exchange is effected in the course of a corporate reorganization. The section referred to provides as follows:
"No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a
corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the
plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in
such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization."242
It is true that recapitalization is one of the six approved methods
of reorganization. 243 The regulations, for example, expressly provide
that the issuance of stock in exchange for outstanding bonds satisfies
the prerequisites of that characterization. 244 And while the commissioner insists on the other hand that an exchange of bonds for bonds falls
short of the mark-constituting a refinancing of indebtedness rather
than a recapitalization245-the courts have held otherwise.246
In the fi~st cases to consider the foregoing matters, the Board of Tax
Appeals was led by the sweeping language of the statute quoted above
to conclude that a corporation was free pf tax on an exchange of issues
if it had proceeded according to a plan of reorganization. 247 There is
every reason to believe, however, that the section in question was not
actually intended to have that effect. The history of that section indicates that it was not intended to cover the corporation at all. Indeed its
first statutory antecedent, dating back to 1918, provided that "when in
connection with the reorganization ... of a corporation a person receives
in place of stock or securities owned by him new stock or securities ... , no gain or loss shall be deemed to occur from the exchange."248
the original issue of bonds does not draw a line between those which are and those which
are not substantial in amount.
242 I.R.C. §112(b)(3).
243 I.R.C. §ll2(g)(I).
244Treas. Reg. 111, §29.112(g)-2.
245 I.T. 2035, III-I Cum. Bul. 55 (1924).
246 Commissioner v. Neustadt's Trust, (2d Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 528.
247 Capento Securities Corporation, 47 B.T.A. 691 (1942). See Hummell-Ross Fibre
Corporation, 40 B.T.A. 821 (1939).
248 Revenue Act of 1918, §202(b). (Italics added).
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Immunity, therefore, was provided only for the stockholder or bondholder.249 When this language was reshaped in 1924 into what is now
its present form, the responsible congressional committee indicatoo
that the revision involved nothing more than "minor changes in phraseology."250 This all important history was apparently rescued from
oblivion when one of the board's decisions supra was brought on appeal
before the First Circuit; at least the latter court rested its decision on
a ground wholly apart from the reorganization provisions, asserting
that the applicability of those provisions remained an open question. 251
The foregoing discussion should indicate the shape which any definitive answer must eventually take.
The consequence which should attach where a bargain discharge
is effected by an original issue of a debtor-corporation's stock should,
like the bond-for-bond situation discussed above, tum on the validity
of an analogy to the receipt of cash premiums on the sale of stock
issues. The Treasury normally considers the receipt of a subscription
price as a capital transaction giving rise to neither gain nor loss whether
or not the shares are sold at a premium or discount. 252 The notion that
the entire price is a contribution of capital even serves to free the premium from the amortization requirement imposed with respect to bond
premiums.
.
The absence of definitive authority until 1942 with respect to the
case where stock with a stated par was issued in the first instance in
cancellation of an even greater debt suggests that the Treasury had been
treating such a gain as it would have treated an ordinary cash premium.
However, a different rule evolved with respect to treasury stock. Even
where such was used to discharge an equal amount of indebtedness,
the government with the agreement of the Board of Tax Appeals insisted that gain was realized to the extent of the difference between the
cost basis of the shares and the amount of the indebtedness.268 The
analogy to the cash premium situation was maintained, however, for
the same result would have attached had such been involved since the
corporation would be dealing "in its own shares as it might in the shares
of another corporation."264
An obvious attempt by the Raytheon Production Corporation to
249 The inference drawn from the original language of the statute is supported by the
illustrations which the manager of the bill developed on the Senate Floor. 57 CoNG. REc.
828 (1918).
250 H.R. 179, 68th Cong., 1st sess., p. 13 (1924 ).
251 Commissioner v. Capento Securities Corp., (1st Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 382.
252Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-16; Finance Corporation of New England, 16 B.T.A.
763 (1929).
25s A. R. Purdy Co., 3 T.C.M. 1059 (1944).
254Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-15.
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avoid the impact of the Kirby doctrine by having an affiliated corporation acquire Raytheon bonds from outsiders at a discount, the acquisition being followed by an exchange between the affiliates of the bonds
for newly issued stock of Raytheon, led the Bureau in 1942 to challenge
for the first time the immunity claimed for a corporation with respect
to new issues. The government in that case maintained that gain was
realized by Raytheon to the extent of the claim for accrued and previously deducted interest which had been cancelled somehow in the
course of the exchange, and to the extent of the difference between
the market value of the shares and the face amount of the principal
which it owed, the latter being equal to the par value of the shares.
The Board of Tax Appeals agreed with the first contention; discharge
of the back interest had freed assets previously offset by an obligation.
But it rejected the second, concluding that the corporate assets were
still subject to a liability, though different in form, equivalent to the
principal of the debt, and that the latter was simply the subscription
price which gave rise to neither gain nor loss under the regulations
discussed above. 255
Subsequent litigation does not clearly disclose whether the Treasury intended as a general proposition to establish the practice of assessing a tax, as it did here with respect to the back interest, whenever it
appeared that there was a difference in the face amount of the shares
and the total amount of the indebtedness. It could not in any event
~ave anticipated much success, for the board's decision supra quite
properly implied that had the newly issued shares actually been treated
by the parties as consideration for the cancellation of the back interest,
the so-called gain would then have been treated as part of the generally
tax immune subscription price. 256 Ordinarily evidence to the contrary,
i.e., a showing that the creditor did not actually seek the best price
available, would justify characterizing the benefit to the corporation as
a gift under the doctrine of the American Dental Co. case.257 It was
not so characterized here only because there was no evidence whatever
indicating the reason for the cancellation. And the taxpayer's brief
simply asserted that the "'claim to accrued interest disappeared.' " 258
Conceivably it might have been outlawed by the statute of limitations2 55 Capento Securities Corp., 47 B.T.A. 691 (1942), affd. (1st Cir. 1944) 140 F.
(2d) 382.
256 Alcazar Hotel, Inc., 1 T.C. 872 (1943) is to the same effect.
257 Cf. Claridge Apartments Co., 1 T.C. 163 (1942), decided on another ground in
323 U.S. 141, 65 S.Ct. 172 (1944). The Tax Court's decision can be distinguished only
on the theory that the American Dental Co. case did not apply to situations arising under
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.
258 Capento Securities Corp., 47 B.T.A. 691 at 696 (1942).
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a fact which would have taken the case outside the range of the American Dental Co. decision. A ·possibility of this sort presumably furnished the basis for its characterization as income.
Subsequent litigation does show with respect to the second of the
two matters decided by. the board supra that the Treasury was not content for a period of several years with the neutralization of the significance which it had attached to the market value of the stock. However, the view of the board, that such was a neutral factor was subsequently approved by the First Circuit with respect to out-of-court recapitalizations259 as well as in the case where the recapitalization was
effected by a reorganization under Chapter .X of the Bankruptcy Act. 260
The commissioner has now acquiesced in the board's conclusion with
respect to the latter type reorganization, 261 one which involved the
slightly different but closely related question of whether it was necessary for the corporation to reduce the basis of its property by the amount
of debt "cancelled or reduced."
The lower courts' conclusion with respect to the neutral character
of the market value of newly issued stock is deceptively attractive. At
first blush there seems to be considerable logic in subsuming the situation under the rule which provides that no gain or loss is realized with
respect to the subscription price of new stock. In other words, if a corporation would be immune under the "subscription price" rule, as the
board assumed, on selling for $500,000 in cash a new issue of stock
bearing a market value of but $50,000, why should it not also be free
of tax when its own bonds in the amount of $500,000 are received in
lieu of the cash?
.
Complete immunity for the subscription price is indeed quite reasonable in certain settings. There is little justification, for example, in
taxing the excess over par which a new corporation may have received
on the sale for cash of its first issue. Nor is there any reason to attach
significance to the market value of the stock in the instance where
existing stockholders acquire a new but subsequent issue on a pro rata
basis. The reason calling for immunity in these two instances is too
obvious.to state. While it is not likely as a practical matter that we will
encounter many cases like that first mentioned in the preceding paragraph, i.e., the case where individuals without any previous equitable
259 Commissioner v. Capento Securities Corp., (1st Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 382.
260 Tower Building Corp., 6 T.C. 125 (1946); Motor Mart Trust, 4 T.C. 931 (1945),
affd. (1st Cir. 1946) 156 F .(2d) 122. The tax court first adopted this position in Claridge
Apartments Co., 1 T.C. 163 (1942), revd. (7th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 962. The circuit
court was reversed on another ground, 323 U.S. 140, 65 S.Ct. 172 (1944).
261 See G.C.M. 25277, 1947-1 Cum. Bui. 44. This memorandum revoked an earlier
rifting to the contrary.
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interest in an old corporation pay $500,000 in cash for a new but additional stock issue worth but $50,000, we may concede for purposes of
the argument that the subscription price rule would also apply there.
A bondholder on the other hand whose claim is in the amom;i.t of
$500,000 will often be quite willing when caught in one circumstance
to exchange his bonds for stock having a value of only $50,000. The
instance referred to concerns the case, of course, where the bonds are
worth but $50,000. A realistic appraisal of this latter situation would
lead to the conclusion that the subscription price to the bondholder is
really but $50,000; the remaining $450,000 of the claim is in effect
forgiven simply because the bondholder knows that it cannot be collected. ·In other words, the realities of this situation are quite different
from those in the preceding case. The analogy which the board drew
between them completely disregarded their most essential characteristics. To illustrate further, if the bonds were worth $52,000, that
amount should be controlled by the subscription price rule even though
a jury might say the stock was worth but $50,000; only the remaining
$448,000 would then be governed by the philosophy of the Kirby doctrine. According to this analysis, the Treasury should make a slight
revision in its approach. It should assess a tax on the difference between
the market value of the bonds and their earlier but greater issue price,
for it is this amount which is in effect forgiven. This may on occasion
lead to the same or to only a slightly different result from that called
for by the formula which the Treasury has pressed on the courts, i.e.,
one which measured the gain by the difference between the market
value of the stock and the issue price of the bonds. But the difference
between the two formulas will serve to point up that part of a transaction which is really subject to the rationale of the subscription price rule
on the one hand, and that portion which ought to be treated as realized
income.
· Signipcance of Actual Retirement
Any significance which might be attached to the fact that a bond
which was re-purchased by the issuing corporation at a discount was
not immediately retired would ultimately depend on the philosophy
which also argues for tax deferment in the instance where property
subject to a purchase money mortgage is retained after the mortgage
is retired at a discount. The question common to these situations is
whether or not the transaction has actually been completed for tax
purposes.
The question of whether the Kirby case is immediately applicable
though actual retirement is postponed has arisen most frequently in
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connection with one of two situations. The first arose out of the fact
that a corporation can acquire its own bonds for investment, and perhaps subsequent re-sale, just as it might deal in what has become known
as treasury stock. The second involves the situation where the corporation merely decides to postpone turning re-purchased bonds in to the
indenture trustee for cancellation until the next succeeding taxable
year.
The argument from the standpoint of authority that taxable income
is realized only at the moment of actual retirement can be traced to the
first regulations and to certain possibly relevant language in the Kirby
case itself. Until 1934 the regulations dealing with the tax on savings
of this sort provided for an assessment only if a corporation "purchases
and retires" its own bonds at a discount. 262 The retirement aspect,
while fully satisfied in the Kirby case and not, therefore, really in issue,
was nevertheless the subject of possible emphasis in that Justice Holmes
did refer to the "obligation of bonds now extinct,"263 and concluded his
opinion with the sweeping assertion that the court saw "no reason why
the regulations should not be accepted as a correct statement of the
law."264
The Board of Tax Appeals was not convinced, however, that the
above authorities really furnished a compelling reason for treating actual retirement as an indispensable prerequisite. The sine qua non of
the Kirby case was said in Garland Coal & Mining Co. to be the withdrawal of the bonds from circulation, the re-purchase having closed a
transaction which began with their original sale; "a resale would be an
entirely new transaction." 265
While the actual result which the board reached was affirmed on
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia did at the
same time reshape the applicable formula. It turned the case on the
question of whether or not the debtor actually intended to keep the
debt alive with a view, for example, of possible re-sale. 266 The debtor
would not, however, have freed itself from an immediate tax according
to the court if it had intended only to postpone to a subsequent year
the actual surrender to the indenture trustee for purposes of cancellation.
It was at this point that the regulations were changed; all reference
262

See e.g. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 544, and Treas. Reg. 77, art. 68.

2ss 284 U.S. 1 at 3, 52 S.Ct. 4 (1931).

Ibid.
28 B.T.A. 348 at 352 (1933). The Board had previously reached the same result
without discussion. Woodward Iron Co., 24 B.T.A. 1050 (1931). Accord, Montana,
Wyoming & Southern Railroad Co., 31 B.T.A. 62 (1934), affd. (3d Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d)
1007, cert. den. 296 U.S. 604, 56 S.Ct. 120.
206 Garland Coal & Mining Co. v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 663.
264
265

1951]

REALIZATION OF INCOME

697

to retirement was deleted. 267 The board continued thereafter to resolve
difficulties of the sort under discussion by relying on its own decision
in the Garland Coal & Mining Co. case. 268 Though it rejected the
formula keyed to the debtor's intention,269 the latter view has found
support in the Fourth Circuit.270 The Sixth Circuit on the other hand
seems to have sided with the view developed by the board. 271
Probably all courts would have agreed, as has the board, to a postponement of tax incidence in the case where there was simply an agreement to cancel a debt in the future, the consummation of the agreement depending on certain important conditions which were not satisfied in the taxable year. 272 But there seems to be little justification for
such postponement where the debtor has actually acquired the evidence
of his outstanding indebtedness, actual cancellation depending at that
point solely on his own whim and caprice. The Supreme Court has
very recently-in Commissioner v. Jacobson273-resolved in favor of
the government the conflict which existed on this point. There the
Court stated:
"The respondent realized an immediate financial gain from his
purchase of these bonds at a discount. By that acquisition he was
enabled, at will, to cancel them and thus discharge himself from
liability to pay them. While the record indicates that he held them
'intact,' apparently without crediting released indebtedness on
them or otherwise physically cancelling them in whole or in
part. . . , his possession of them and control over them is not disputed and the petitioner has properly treated their acquisition as
constituting a reduction of the respondent's debts to the extent of
their face amount." 274
Conclusion
The preceding discussion should clearly demonstrate that it is not
possible to characterize the results which have be<:;n reached by the
courts since the decision in the Kirby case by a compact rule of thumb.
267 Treas. Reg. 86, art. 22(a)-18.
268 Eastern Building Corporation, 45 B.T.A. 188 (194 l); Transylvania Railroad Co.,
36 B.T.A. 333 (1937), revd., Transylvania Railroad Co. v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1938)
99 F. (2d) 69.
269 Transylvania Railroad Co., 36 B.T.A. 333 (1937), revd. Transylvania Railroad Co.
v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 69.
270Transylvania Railroad Co. v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 69.
271 Central Paper Co. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1946) 158 F. (2d) 131; Tennessee
Consolidated Coal Co., (6th Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 631.
272 Walker v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1937) 88 F. (2d) 170, cert. den. 302 U.S.
692, 58 S.Ct. 11 (1937); Reginald Denny, 33 B.T.A. 738 (1935). Cf. Pittsburgh & West
Virginia Railway Co., 9 T.C. 268 (1947), revd. (3d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 1010, cert.
den. 337 U.S. 939, 69 S.Ct. 1514 (1949).
213 336 U.S. 28, 69 S.Ct. 358 (1949).
214 Id. at 38.
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On the one hand it would be inaccurate to say that taxability turns on
a showing that there has been a bargain reduction of a liability, for
inter alia this rule, emphasizing the right hand side of the balance
sheet, is at odds with the results reached in the case of insolvent debtors.
Nor is it enough on the other hand to use a general net assets approach,
i.e., to say that liability turns on whether or not assets are freed for a
debtor's personal use and benefit by a bargain reduction of offsetting
liabilities. While this takes account of the insolvent debtor's situation,
it ignores inter alia the significance which has been attached to the
character of the particular consideration which was received by the
debtor at the time the original obligation was created as well as that
attached to numerous matters, involving that same consideration,
which arose after the debt was created. One could go on setting up
generalized straw formulas only to illustrate their deficiencies. But
the fact that a common denominator in the form of a compact judicial
formula cannot be extracted is quite consistent with the philosophy
which made the Kirby2 75 decision possible in the first.instance, for there
Holmes, its author, had made it constitutio:,;ially possible to tax at least
some bargain discharges only by ignoring much of what had been said
in the earlier decision of Eisner v ..Macomber. 276 His conclusion that,
"We see nothing to be gained by the discussion of judicial definitions,"277 was simply in recognition of the fact that a notion of income
must cut across many different kinds of situations; so that account might
be taken of these, he freed the concept from confinement.
The absence of an approve·d rule of thumb has, of course, resulted
in much uncertainty even with respect to some frequently recurring
situations, e.g., the uncertainty with respect to the exact consequence
following the bargain discharge of a purchase money mortgage. Our
judicial experience with cancellation or retirement problems also includes an accumulation of some unfortuna.te results. A step-child of
the General Utilities 278 case, viz., the immunity accorded a debtor who
derives a gain after obtaining a loan in foreign money by repaying it in
kind with coin purchased under a more favorable rate of exchange, is
illustrative.
In view of the foregoing, Congress would now do well to re-examine judicial results of the sort mentioned with a view toward corrective
legislation; at the same time it should extend the r~lief presently provided in sections 22(b)(9) and I 13(b)(3) for corporations to individual debtors.
215 284 U.S. I, 52 S.Ct. 4 (1931).
216 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920).
211 Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States, 284
21s 296 U.S. 200, 56 S.Ct. 185 (1935).

U.S. I at 3, 52 S.Ct. 4 (1931).

